Three Perspectives on Abraham's Defense Against Kant's Charge of Immoral Conduct
s.
The Need for a Trial in a Kantian Court
Throughout history no mere mortal has been more revered and esteemed by so many diverse people than Abraham, great patriarch of the three enduring monotheistic religions. Yet Judaism, Christianity and Islam all agree that this man attempted to kill his own, innocent son, an act so dastardly that it would normally be judged both immoral and illegal in any civil society.
Surprisingly, the scriptures of these three religious faiths praise Abraham for this very act, justifying it in very different ways, but all portraying it as the paradigm of religious obedience.
In the reasoned opinion of Immanuel Kant, one of the western philosophers most highly respected by scholars of all three faiths, Abraham's murderous intent should not be so easily excused.
1 Instead of following the traditional religious interpretations, we should condemn Abraham and learn from his near fatal mistake. If Abraham really was responding to God's command -a possibility raised in the scriptures of all three faiths -then he must have misunderstood what God wanted him to do, for no God worthy of worship would command us to break the moral law and expect us to obey. All three religious faiths agree with Kant, that murder is an immoral act. If God was indeed testing Abraham, then Kant insists he failed the test: unlike Job (see e.g., Job 26-31), he did not stand up to God and refuse to accept an unjust situation.
Kant was not opposed to the use of religious figures as paradigms of moral behavior, a practice that can be especially instructive in moral education; 2 but he did not count Abraham worthy to be included in a list of such moral exemplar Abraham himself, so we imagine, has little ability and no desire to justify his action rationally, for he is content simply to refer to the voice he believes came from God. For reasons that will become clear in the following sections, proponents of the three faiths are aware that their hero is in danger of being declared insane (see note 26, below); they have therefore sought our assistance in providing Abraham with a defense that will stand up in a Kantian court. Taking up the role of Abraham's defense attorneys, we will seek to refute Kant's charges and show that they cannot be sustained in light of the testimonies concerning Abraham's character and motivation that are available in the Jewish Bible, the Christian New Testament and the Islamic
Koran. As such, our task will not be to represent the ways various interpreters belonging to each historical faith have, in fact, interpreted the theological (or other) implications of Abraham's act.
In a courtroom, that would be dismissed as hearsay. Rather, our focus will be on the material evidence (the texts) and on the operative laws that govern this imagined court (i.e., the basic principles of Kantian philosophy).
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The jury deciding the outcome of this trial consists (so we imagine) not of scholars (though scholars may be called upon as expert witnesses to present the facts) but of ordinary, morally-conscientious people who, though they may or may not be committed to a particular Three Perspectives on Abraham's Defense, page 3 religious faith, are all sufficiently rational to be able to make assessments within broadly Kantian guidelines. In hopes of persuading the diverse members of such a jury, bound as they are by the objective principles of a morally-legislated courtroom, we will not assume the truth of any specific historical faith. However, in the course of presenting our case, we will refer on occasion to the defendant's own religious beliefs, in order to give the jury an accurate understanding of his character, as assumed, in turn, by each of the three scriptures we are taking as evidence.
The main goal of this thought experiment will not be to persuade the jury members to affirm the non-moral aspects of any of the three faiths, but rather to determine whether Abraham (when we consider his conduct within the context of each faith in turn) can be acquitted of the charge of immorality, using Kantian principles alone as a standard of judgment. If successful in achieving this first goal, a secondary goal will be to determine whether a Kantian jury would have sufficient evidence to uphold Abraham as an exemplar of the moral purity that is the only Kantian indicator of a genuinely religious faith. We do not claim that Abraham himself could have defended his action in the way we are attempting, nor even that he would have wanted to do so. Abraham might prefer simply to rely on the tenets of his historically-contingent faith, including his presumed communication with God, and let the chips fall where they may. By contrast, we imagine ourselves as having been employed by the three faiths to reason in whatever (Kantian) way may be necessary in order to free their shared hero from the dire consequences of Kant's charge.
The Textual Evidence for an Indictment
Jews and Christians share the same scriptural source for their accounts of the incident in question. In Genesis 22:1-10 (NIV) we read: This text, like the one from Genesis, portrays a man who, by all appearances, is willfully carrying out an immoral act -in this case, solely because he has interpreted a dream as a special command God had given uniquely to him, requiring him to do so. As prosecutor for this case, Kant would present these two reports to the Court as sufficient evidence to proceed with a trial;
for, although they differ in several important details -details that will influence how we formulate our case for Abraham's defense from the different perspectives of each faith -both accounts contain clear admissions that Abraham acted with the intent to kill his innocent son.
Kant's Case for Prosecution
Kant's basis for seeking to prosecute Abraham's conduct is two-pronged: from the theoretical standpoint, the issue is how a person is able to discern a divine command (as opposed, For if God should really speak to a human being, the latter could still never know that it was God speaking. It is quite impossible for a human being to apprehend the infinite by his senses, distinguish it from sensible beings, and be acquainted with it as such. -But in some cases the human being can be sure that the voice he hears is not God's; for if the voice commands him to do something contrary to moral law, then no matter how majestic the apparition may be, and no matter how it may seem to surpass the whole of nature, he must consider it an illusion.
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Although a person can never know for certain whether a commanding voice heard inside one's own head has come from God, Kant is not rejecting this possibility altogether. Rather, he is reminding religious believers, or the members of the jury in the present context, that our theoretical ignorance in such situations makes room for a merely negative practical principle: a person is free to treat an inner voice as a divine command, and may obey such a command in the faith that it expresses God's will, only if the command can be interpreted as being at least not immoral. What this means for Abraham's case is that in a Kantian court he cannot plead innocent on the grounds that "God told me to do it!"
On the first (theoretical) issue, discerning the divine as an object of experience, the problem arises because humans as a species depend on their senses for knowledge. By means of input from the senses, as processed by the categories imposed by the human mind, we are able to obtain reliable knowledge about the empirical world. However, Kant argues in the Critique of Pure Reason that this limits our possible knowledge to finite objects; we can and do form ideas Three Perspectives on Abraham's Defense, page 7 about the infinite, but we can never isolate it as a definite object of experience. As a result, we have no way of distinguishing, through theoretical reasoning alone, between an illusion whereby a finite object merely seems infinite to us and an experience of something genuinely infinite.
A simple analogy from the geometry of human vision may illustrate effectively how this point relates to the story of Abraham. Imagine two parallel lines, like straight railroad tracks, one being very long (let's say, a thousand miles) and the other being infinitely long. A person standing in a space between and within sight of these lines would see them as receding to a single "vanishing point". A human observer who is far away from either endpoint of the very long line would have no idea that the infinite line extends out beyond the end of finite line. As a result, a person in that situation would have no way, through the senses alone, of determining which line was truly infinite and which line was just very long. A similar problem occurs, Kant argues, any time a person claims to have an experience of God. The most such a person can do is to compare the experience with other, obviously finite experiences (e.g., the tracks on a toy train set) and determine that because the former is much greater than the latter, it might have an infinite (cf. supernatural) source. But then again, the appearance of infinity also might be an hallucination, as in the case of the very long line, or the supernatural source might be not divine but devilish. Thus, human observers who are faced with a power that is obviously greater than any ordinary human power are not able to know for sure, through theoretical (sense-based) reasoning alone, that they have experienced God. In a word: humans are not able to intuit the infinite (or divine) in a way that can be conceptualized in order to produce reliable empirical knowledge. This is an incontrovertible principle of the Kantian court.
If Kant, as prosecuting attorney, had a mind to persuade religious members of the jury on this first point, he might point out that this limitation of human observation is acknowledged primacy over theoretical reason, because the moral law is of infinite value and we are able to discern it (through the inner power of conscience) and to apply it in practice (through the power of free choice). No matter how deep Abraham's faith might have been, he could not have been theoretically certain that an apparently divine "voice" came from God, so he had no right to trust it, once it told him to do something wrong; in a Kantian courtroom, alleged ignorance of this law of genuine (rational) religion is no excuse, for the moral law is common to all. Kant would not need to recount all the details of his moral philosophy if faced with the task of prosecuting
Abraham before a jury of common, morally-conscientious citizens. A more persuasive approach would be to paint with broad strokes a picture of human morality according to Kantian principles.
We shall therefore offer an illustration that presents quite plainly the logic behind one of Kant's most controversial theories, his claim that each moral (free) individual makes a timeless (or "noumenal") choice to adopt or to reject the moral law as the primary incentive for his or her actions. Following this spontaneous and universal line of thinking will require each of us to reason in this way: I can either accept the rule that I alone will count in this world, or else I can accept the rule that every person will count equally. I cannot rationally will that another hold sway over me, and yet I am aware that I may be destined to be a servant. In that situation, I
would not want the one who is in a position of power over me to live by the former rule. In order to maximize the likelihood of my own well-being, the rule I must therefore choose (as it were, "timelessly") is: every person counts equally, for only this option guarantees that I will count The Jewish, Christian and Islamic scriptures offer distinct, though not entirely incompatible, explanations of why Abraham was not only morally justified to have responded the way he did to the voice he interpreted as conveying a command of God, but is also worthy of being honored as an exemplar of moral virtue. In the following three subsections, we will examine these "three Abrahams," using for the sake of simplicity the abbreviations "AbrahamThree Perspectives on Abraham's Defense, page 13 J," "Abraham-C" and "Abraham-I" to refer, respectively, to the images of Abraham portrayed in the scriptures of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. From each of these three perspectives, we will present a rationale for Abraham's conduct that is consistent with the evidence presented in the relevant scriptural account and is designed to persuade a jury consisting of morally-attuned inquirers that if they abide by the rules of a Kantian court, they must find Abraham not guilty. We can shed some light on the mystery of how a man of such high moral character could appear to be performing an immoral act by comparing Abraham-J to a magician's assistant. The assistant to a magician who is about to perform a death-defying trick is asked to undertake an Three Perspectives on Abraham's Defense, page 15 action (e.g., thrusting a sword through a slit in a closed box) that should result in the death of the participating "victim." The assistant undertakes this "murderous" action (or in some cases, submits to the magician performing the action on her or him) and tries to "kill" the victim (or submits to being "killed"). Should the trick go wrong and the victim actually die, the assistant is not to blame, but rather the magician; for the assistant normally does not understand exactly how the trick works, but merely trusts the magician not to do anything that would cause any real harm.
Despite the appearance of murder, the whole episode is a trick and the victim is never in any real danger. True, Abraham's heart is heavy as he climbs the mountain with his son, but not because he knows he is about to commit a murder -for the death of his son is impossible! Rather, his deep concern is only for the fear that may overcome his son as he watches his father test his own faith in God's promise. Abraham's reason for not telling the lad the details of God's command beforehand is not that he feels guilty that his son is about to die; rather, the extreme emotional intensity of this test of faith prompts Abraham-J to temper the intensity of the experience for his son. Abraham, viewed from the perspective of this defense, knows full well that he will be Abraham-C sets out to kill his son, fully expecting to do so, but only because he is certain that God will then raise Isaac back to life again, as an undeniable confirmation of God's promise to bless this special family. 23 Accordingly, we cannot rightly judge Abraham-C to be a murderer.
Abraham not only wants his son to live and not die, but is fully confident that if he should happen to die as a result of this act of obedience to God, he will be speedily resurrected.
Evidence for Abraham's assurance that Isaac's recovery from death (if any) would be speedy was already presented in the prosecution's textual evidence for indictment: when Abraham told his servants to wait, he explicitly stated that both he and Isaac would soon return. This indicates that Abraham had no doubt as to Isaac's long-term safety and well-being. 24 As already established by the logic of the defense case for Abraham-J, God's hands were tied by virtue of his own word (see note 20); Abraham-C would also naturally assume that God would certainly bring the miracle child back to life. Although this assumption in itself is non-moral and reliance on it admittedly goes beyond the theoretical limits the Kantian court places on our ability to know whether such a miracle had actually happened, this does not make the one possessing such a sincere belief into an immoral person. As his attorneys in a Kantian court, we remind the jury that what matters is whether the faith commitment held by Abraham-C, his belief in such a miracle, encouraged or hampered his ability to obey the moral law. We take no position here on the issue of whether or not our client really was somehow experiencing God.
As the analogy of the magician's assistant does not apply here, we need another analogy Three Perspectives on Abraham's Defense, page 19 to render this version of the defense case more forceful. The Christian scripture portrays
Abraham as a deeply passionate character, acting toward his son much like a passionate lover might act toward the beloved after realizing that the beloved is destined to have someone else as his or her highest love. Love stories often involve the pain of separation, followed by a longawaited (often virtually miraculous) overcoming of the obstacle that has been keeping the lovers apart. In one recent Hollywood romance, involving time travel, the heroine is in love with a man from a previous century; her modern-day boyfriend knows that if she jumps off the Golden Gate
Bridge at a particular time, she will enter a time warp and be transported back to her original situation, to be with her true love. At first she doesn't believe him, but finally the truth dawns on her and together they run to the bridge. At just the right moment, with a worried policeman looking on, she disappears into the time warp just as she falls off the bridge. The policeman immediately reports a suicide; but the (now former) boyfriend knows the truth, that she has gone back to the previous century, where (as the viewer is privileged to see) her true love promptly proposes marriage.
Abraham, of course, is not in love with Isaac. Nevertheless, his love is like that of the would-be boyfriend who recognizes that a separation is necessary for the sake of his beloved.
From the perspective of Abraham-C, Isaac must learn to trust God (the true Lover of his soul) more than his father, even to the point of believing in resurrection from the dead, before he will become a vessel worthy to fulfill God's promise of giving birth to a great nation. With this sacrificial goal of transforming the focus of his son's trust firmly in his mind, Abraham escorts his son up the mountain. In a thoroughly Kantian manner, Abraham-C genuinely does not know whether God will allow him to follow through with the commanded killing; yet he does know that if Isaac dies, he will be immediately resurrected, for otherwise God's command would be Three Perspectives on Abraham's Defense, page 20 immoral and this could not possibly be the case. He also realizes that in this way Isaac will then know that God (who raised him from the dead) should be trusted absolutely, just as his father (who dared to kill him) had so firmly believed. On this defense, Abraham is taking an extreme risk as he raises his knife to stab the bound boy: if he turns out to be wrong (i.e., if that voice was not God's), then he will indeed be a murderer, just as the would-be boyfriend in the film would have been an accessory to suicide, had he been wrong about the time warp on the Golden Gate Bridge. But in both stories, this possibility is ruled out by an extraordinary series of events that leads the hero to have no rational option other than to believe in what would normally seem impossible; as a result, an action that would normally be condemned as putting another person's life at risk is now praised as a self-sacrifice that courageously provides the key to another person's self-transformation.
Abraham-C knows that his act might frighten his son for a short time, and might even cause him some pain, but he is certain that no long-term harm will be done. Instead, the heroic act is sure to benefit the apparent victim: one way or another (the details being entirely up to God), his son would be returning with him down the mountain as a transformed person, possessing the identical resurrection faith formerly held only by his father, a faith based now on personal experience rather than mere hearsay. Whether Isaac himself dies or some substitute is provided at the last minute will not affect this result; for in the former case, Abraham-C reasoned, Isaac would surely be resurrected in time for them to return together to the waiting servants. In These and many other passages indicate why it was so natural for Abraham and Ishmael, considered as proto-Muslims, to assume that martyrs not only end up in paradise, but do so immediately, without needing to await the final Judgment Day.
As we saw from the prosecution's presentation of textual evidence at the outset of these proceedings, Abraham-I has a dream and tells it openly to Ishmael, the son whose mother was Abraham as an exemplar of moral heroism, it means those followers of the three religious faiths who wish to interpret Abraham in this way are permitted to do so.
Postscript
As a concluding, "post-judgment" note, we can look to the three great faiths to demonstrate that this moral understanding of Abraham's motives is consistent with their core understanding of commands or guidance from God. In John 5 we learn that Jesus refused to wait a period of time until the sun went down before healing a man, but did it as soon as the need became apparent. In so doing, we are told, he was "breaking the Sabbath" (5:18) and laid himself open to serious (and legal) reproach from the religious leaders of the day. David is reported to have acted similarly in 1 Samuel 21:1-8, when he ate bread that was designated as holy and set apart for the priests. Yet in both cases scripture interprets these "illegal" actions as appropriate. indicating the modesty expected of a divine being. In a third account, Mohammed's wife believes he is too good and fair and just to be tricked by a demon, so she consults with an older Christian acquaintance and both agree Mohammed must have encountered a heavenly being.
Like Samuel, Paul and Mohammed both appear to have become aware of the divine origin of their experiences only gradually, through appropriate moral reasoning and/or instruction. That is, they had to go beyond the theoretical standpoint of merely assessing the observation and appeal to a deeper set of practical criteria, just as Kant argues must always be done in such cases.
8 Kant the prosecuting attorney might note in his speech to the jury that this rule exhibits the same elementary reasoning implicitly engaged in by children when they so very early come to judge morally with their cries of "that's unfair!" While at first this is naturally prompted by one's realization of a personal deprivation -i.e., I have been treated unjustly (e.g., have received too small a portion of a shared treat) -this then expands to represent the reasoning just described: no person may be treated inequitably; I am a person; and for that reason it is wrong to give me a smaller portion than the others.
9 This conception of the innate recognition of the moral law conforms quite well to the suggestion in Genesis 3:22a, that we know good and evil just like God does -i.e., that in moral matters we who have become aware of our power of free choice are now God's equal. 10 Kant's rather fascinating conception of this "factum" of reason can be explained as follows.
No sane and reasoning person would accept the assertion of John Locke's famous "glass man"
(see An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Chapter XI, paragraph 13, entitled "Difference between idiots and madmen") as a justification for including among the sciences a study of men who are made out of glass. This is simply an idea that possessed a madman, Three Perspectives on Abraham's Defense, page 36 although he was entirely rational in all of his actions as a result of his possession. The idea of freedom should be just as nonsensical to people of science, for it detracts from the necessity that is requisite for understanding the most elementary experience -e.g., that in spite of how things appear to our senses, things do not actually get smaller as they move away from us and fingers do not split as they approach the nose. Nevertheless, sane intelligent persons of science have actually wanted to include in the university the study of freedom (i.e., ethics), which they would never have been able to do except for the awesome respect they involuntarily have for the moral law.
11 The Conflict of the Faculties, 7:63n. terms of a "teleological suspension of the ethical", see Green (1988), 84-86, 89-94, 98-99, 121-127 . Green notes that for some Jewish interpreters it is God more than Abraham who suspends the ethical order for the sake of his higher goal, a goal that is itself ultimately moral (101).
However, "Within the Jewish sources, there is not a hint of Kierkegaard's interpretation" (102).
Even after a thorough sketch of the history of Christian interpretations, Green can conclude (122) that "Kierkegaard's interpretation of Genesis 22 is enormously eccentric." Green says "Kant did not openly condemn Abraham" but implied his attitude was that of "dangerous religious fanatics" (123), so Kierkegaard was trying to defend Abraham against Kant (while also reacting to the perversion of Christianity as a state religion in Denmark). In an interesting twist, Green While we agree completely with the latter assertion, we do not think this renders useless the ongoing attempts of interpreters to take a fresh look at the original evidence and attempt to defend it anew, as it were, "from scratch", as we are doing here.
16 Green (1988, 91-92) points out that in the Hebrew mindset, children were the property of their parents, so the "moral distance" we (like Kierkegaard) assume between Abraham and Isaac wasn't necessarily assumed. Jewish interpreters typically think of Isaac as having been 37 years old at the time of the incident, and some therefore assume he fully participated in the act (92-93), much like the Islamic account portrays more explicitly. They infer this from the use of "together"
in the text and the assumption that Abraham could not have forced a full-grown adult into such a situation. Green notes (248n41) that "The rabbis derived this number [37] by reckoning Sarah's God's only other option would be to break a promise, and this is something Abraham knew (and any Kantian jury would be compelled to agree) could not happen. Sarah. Instead Abraham was cowed and in order to save his skin told the king a "half-truth": that Sarah was his sister -she was his half-sister, but also his wife! This could account for
Abraham's willingness to go through the motions of slaying his son without trying to find a way out. From his perspective, he had failed the first test, so he was determined not to fail again. By this time, Abraham had seen the promise of God validated through Isaac's miraculous birth, so his confidence was based as much on sight as on faith.
22 Such overlapping exists between all three of our defenses. This would be even more pronounced if we were to include evidence not only from the scriptures themselves but also from other sources within the faiths. Judaism's Rabbinic literature, for example, prefigures the Christian hope of resurrection as a way of interpreting the Genesis narrative. As Green (1988), 96-97, points out, some rabbis speculate that the knife actually killed Isaac when it touched his neck, but God resurrected him. On the other hand (104), "in Christian thinking, the Akedah became the prototype of the Christ event." Given that Christ effects God's forgiveness, and forgiveness is interpreted as a suspension (or at least diversion) of justice, Christians tend to interpret both it and the Akedah in an extreme way that requires no moral accountability on point in using suffixes to distinguish between the three portrayals of Abraham is merely to acknowledge that the interpretation offered in each of these three subsections is grounded in the primary scripture of the relevant faith. 24 This point was acknowledged by Christian interpreters as early as Origen (see Green, 1988, 107-108) , who reasoned that in order to save Abraham from being an outright liar, we must assume Abraham thought both that he would fulfill God's command and that they would both return; and the only way to resolve this patent contradiction would be for Abraham to have believed his son would be resurrected. In tracing the subsequent history of Christian theological interpretations from Augustine (108-109) and Aquinas (109-114) through the early divine command ethicists (114-118) and Reformation theologians (118-121) to Kierkegaard (121ff),
Green portrays Aquinas as the key figure who first clearly recognized and tried to harmonize the possible conflict between God's command and our human understanding of the moral law. 25 The examples Kant gives of great moral exemplars (see note 2) are all people who are willing to endure great suffering rather than do something out of self-interest. That Abraham-C could not have been acting out of self-interest was a feature of the story that was wholly overlooked by Kant. He apparently neglected the fact that, as Green (1988) concurs, the passage quoted above from Hebrews implies that faithful obedience to God's command "cannot ultimately contradict" morality (105-106). James 2:21-23 could be cited as further evidence of this position from Christian scripture, for Abraham's act is there portrayed as an example of how faith must make itself real in action in order to be considered moral (i.e., in order to be "reckoned as righteousness"). The notion that a believer's conduct could be immoral while nevertheless being an authentic expression of religious faith is unthinkable to the author of James.
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26 Insanity is the delinking of our rational capacity from our nature as animal beings. To be insane is to render oneself not responsible, because personality is higher than humanity as it functions in human nature. So, the worst judgment the Kantian court can pass on Abraham is to send him to the mental hospital. However, as his attorneys, we are here attempting to show that such a judgment misses the deeply emotional (animal), other-centered core of Abraham's reasoning processes, and that once these are recognized and taken into account, his action turns out to be eminently moral and thus praiseworthy. (forthcoming) delves most deeply into its various facets and applications. 30 That religious believers in all three faiths ignore this principle is undeniably true. Our references in the text show that at least Christianity, and probably also Judaism, has clear scriptural evidence to support the Kantian principle of the priority of morality over statutory law.
We have searched for a parallel passage from the Koran, but without success. Although Kant believed only Christianity cherishes this core principle (Religion 6:52 and Conflict 7:9), we welcome adherents of the other two faiths to prove he was wrong by showing how Judaism and
Islam are not as deeply mired in the priority of statutory obedience as Kant believed them to be.
Kant mentioned Islam only in passing (Religion 6:184n, (193) (194) and with an even less nuanced understanding than his account of Judaism. He appears to have viewed Islam as an "extortionist" religion because of its tendency to honor abject submission to God's command above all else -even above ordinary conceptions of morality. 
